Is Green Chip (CHIP) a honeypot?

Tok{In} could not answer this at the last scan: every pool holds less than $100 of liquidity (the largest holds < $0.01), so no trade could be simulated against CHIP. Treat it as unverified rather than safe, and re-scan once a pool is funded.

Unknown — and here is why: every pool holds less than $100 of liquidity (the largest holds < $0.01), so Tok{In} never attempted a sell. This has not been tested in either direction.

What risks does CHIP have on Robinhood Chain?

Tok{In} flagged 1 risk flag (Allowance Bypass), derived from Gigahorse bytecode decompilation and live DEX liquidity checks.

Green Chip (CHIP) honeypot and safety scan, Robinhood Chain

CHIP

Scanned 23d ago

No Source

Illiquid

Owner Renounced

Top 10 Hold 32.0%

Market Cap

—

Total Liquidity

$0.0₁₁2822

Total Supply

1.00B

Tax (send / receive)

0% / 0%

Creator

Owner

Green Chip (CHIP) on Robinhood Chain shows high-risk patterns in Tok{In}'s bytecode analysis. No trade was simulated because every pool holds less than $100 of liquidity (the largest holds < $0.01), so nobody has checked whether this token can be sold. That is not a clean bill of health. Tok{In} found 1 risk flag (Allowance Bypass). Market cap —, liquidity < $0.01, last scanned 23d ago. This is not financial advice: verdicts can change, so re-scan before trading.

Static-analysis risk flags detected for Green Chip (CHIP)
Risk flag	Severity
	Danger

10 of 22 checks passed · 10 undetermined · last scanned 23d ago· powered by Dedaub's Decompiler

1 flag

1 danger10 passed1 noted10 not determined

Tokens can leave a wallet through an approval-based transfer the holder never granted. Whoever holds that privilege can drain any wallet that holds this token, with no approval ever signed. A standard ERC-20 token cannot do this.

Privileged address

Whether verified source exists for this contract's exact code. The match is on the code itself rather than the address, so source from an identical deployment counts and this address can still show as unverified on the block explorer. The findings above do not depend on it: Tok{In} reads the deployed bytecode directly.